The security risks faced by Parliaments, legislatures, elected representatives, and the officials who support them, differ greatly according to their evolving national and local circumstances, among other things. For some, the biggest security risks may stem from disruptive protesters and cyber criminals, but terrorism may pose the most concerning risks for others. In fact, threat actors differ enormously in their intentions and capabilities, which also change over time.

    Given that risk is a product of threat, vulnerability, and impact, it follows that ultimately there are only three ways to reduce security risk — namely, by reducing the threat, reducing the vulnerability, or reducing the impact (or some combination thereof). Reducing the threat element of security risk is difficult, especially in the case of determined and capable threat actors. Responsibility for reducing threats tends to lie mainly with national law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies. That said, parliaments and other organisations can contribute to threat reduction through deterrence — in other words, by influencing the intentions of threat actors. Carefully crafted security-minded communications can convey a discouraging message to potential attackers, to the effect that they should expect to confront professional security measures and face a substantial risk of being caught. For instance, a parliamentary website might advertise that visitors will undergo ‘airport-style screening’, without explaining precisely what that entails. The public should be reassured by such message, whereas some threat actors might be deterred.

Paul Martin. Parliamentary security: an introductory guide.

Internet: <www.cpahq.org> (adapted).

    The security risks faced by Parliaments, legislatures, elected representatives, and the officials who support them, differ greatly according to their evolving national and local circumstances, among other things. For some, the biggest security risks may stem from disruptive protesters and cyber criminals, but terrorism may pose the most concerning risks for others. In fact, threat actors differ enormously in their intentions and capabilities, which also change over time.

    Given that risk is a product of threat, vulnerability, and impact, it follows that ultimately there are only three ways to reduce security risk — namely, by reducing the threat, reducing the vulnerability, or reducing the impact (or some combination thereof). Reducing the threat element of security risk is difficult, especially in the case of determined and capable threat actors. Responsibility for reducing threats tends to lie mainly with national law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies. That said, parliaments and other organisations can contribute to threat reduction through deterrence — in other words, by influencing the intentions of threat actors. Carefully crafted security-minded communications can convey a discouraging message to potential attackers, to the effect that they should expect to confront professional security measures and face a substantial risk of being caught. For instance, a parliamentary website might advertise that visitors will undergo ‘airport-style screening’, without explaining precisely what that entails. The public should be reassured by such message, whereas some threat actors might be deterred.

Paul Martin. Parliamentary security: an introductory guide.

Internet: <www.cpahq.org> (adapted).

    The security risks faced by Parliaments, legislatures, elected representatives, and the officials who support them, differ greatly according to their evolving national and local circumstances, among other things. For some, the biggest security risks may stem from disruptive protesters and cyber criminals, but terrorism may pose the most concerning risks for others. In fact, threat actors differ enormously in their intentions and capabilities, which also change over time.

    Given that risk is a product of threat, vulnerability, and impact, it follows that ultimately there are only three ways to reduce security risk — namely, by reducing the threat, reducing the vulnerability, or reducing the impact (or some combination thereof). Reducing the threat element of security risk is difficult, especially in the case of determined and capable threat actors. Responsibility for reducing threats tends to lie mainly with national law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies. That said, parliaments and other organisations can contribute to threat reduction through deterrence — in other words, by influencing the intentions of threat actors. Carefully crafted security-minded communications can convey a discouraging message to potential attackers, to the effect that they should expect to confront professional security measures and face a substantial risk of being caught. For instance, a parliamentary website might advertise that visitors will undergo ‘airport-style screening’, without explaining precisely what that entails. The public should be reassured by such message, whereas some threat actors might be deterred.

Paul Martin. Parliamentary security: an introductory guide.

Internet: <www.cpahq.org> (adapted).

    The security risks faced by Parliaments, legislatures, elected representatives, and the officials who support them, differ greatly according to their evolving national and local circumstances, among other things. For some, the biggest security risks may stem from disruptive protesters and cyber criminals, but terrorism may pose the most concerning risks for others. In fact, threat actors differ enormously in their intentions and capabilities, which also change over time.

    Given that risk is a product of threat, vulnerability, and impact, it follows that ultimately there are only three ways to reduce security risk — namely, by reducing the threat, reducing the vulnerability, or reducing the impact (or some combination thereof). Reducing the threat element of security risk is difficult, especially in the case of determined and capable threat actors. Responsibility for reducing threats tends to lie mainly with national law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies. That said, parliaments and other organisations can contribute to threat reduction through deterrence — in other words, by influencing the intentions of threat actors. Carefully crafted security-minded communications can convey a discouraging message to potential attackers, to the effect that they should expect to confront professional security measures and face a substantial risk of being caught. For instance, a parliamentary website might advertise that visitors will undergo ‘airport-style screening’, without explaining precisely what that entails. The public should be reassured by such message, whereas some threat actors might be deterred.

Paul Martin. Parliamentary security: an introductory guide.

Internet: <www.cpahq.org> (adapted).

    The security risks faced by Parliaments, legislatures, elected representatives, and the officials who support them, differ greatly according to their evolving national and local circumstances, among other things. For some, the biggest security risks may stem from disruptive protesters and cyber criminals, but terrorism may pose the most concerning risks for others. In fact, threat actors differ enormously in their intentions and capabilities, which also change over time.

    Given that risk is a product of threat, vulnerability, and impact, it follows that ultimately there are only three ways to reduce security risk — namely, by reducing the threat, reducing the vulnerability, or reducing the impact (or some combination thereof). Reducing the threat element of security risk is difficult, especially in the case of determined and capable threat actors. Responsibility for reducing threats tends to lie mainly with national law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies. That said, parliaments and other organisations can contribute to threat reduction through deterrence — in other words, by influencing the intentions of threat actors. Carefully crafted security-minded communications can convey a discouraging message to potential attackers, to the effect that they should expect to confront professional security measures and face a substantial risk of being caught. For instance, a parliamentary website might advertise that visitors will undergo ‘airport-style screening’, without explaining precisely what that entails. The public should be reassured by such message, whereas some threat actors might be deterred.

Paul Martin. Parliamentary security: an introductory guide.

Internet: <www.cpahq.org> (adapted).

    The security risks faced by Parliaments, legislatures, elected representatives, and the officials who support them, differ greatly according to their evolving national and local circumstances, among other things. For some, the biggest security risks may stem from disruptive protesters and cyber criminals, but terrorism may pose the most concerning risks for others. In fact, threat actors differ enormously in their intentions and capabilities, which also change over time.

    Given that risk is a product of threat, vulnerability, and impact, it follows that ultimately there are only three ways to reduce security risk — namely, by reducing the threat, reducing the vulnerability, or reducing the impact (or some combination thereof). Reducing the threat element of security risk is difficult, especially in the case of determined and capable threat actors. Responsibility for reducing threats tends to lie mainly with national law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies. That said, parliaments and other organisations can contribute to threat reduction through deterrence — in other words, by influencing the intentions of threat actors. Carefully crafted security-minded communications can convey a discouraging message to potential attackers, to the effect that they should expect to confront professional security measures and face a substantial risk of being caught. For instance, a parliamentary website might advertise that visitors will undergo ‘airport-style screening’, without explaining precisely what that entails. The public should be reassured by such message, whereas some threat actors might be deterred.

Paul Martin. Parliamentary security: an introductory guide.

Internet: <www.cpahq.org> (adapted).

    The role of the police in a healthy democracy is radically different from their role in authoritarian societies. In autocratic regimes, the police serve mainly to protect not the people, but the regime. The police are therefore typically politicized, with appointments being part of the patronage system that rewards regime loyalists. Police officers spend a great deal of time spying on the populace to unmask political opposition; crime against citizens is less of a concern. Abuse and corruption are usually rife, because police are not held accountable for their actions. Rather, political leaders tolerate abuses by the police in return for police loyalty to the regime.

    By contrast, in democratic societies the primary mission of the police is to protect citizens against crime and disorder, including illegal or corrupt behavior by officials. In democracies, police have carefully circumscribed roles that require close and positive relations with ordinary citizens. The use of arms and pursuit of criminals are rare and take up only a tiny fraction of police time. Instead, police officers spend the vast bulk of their time building relationships with the community through patrols, community-enhancing activities, and listening to citizens. The goal of democratic policing is to build a web of relationships between the community and the police that helps to control crime by making police aware of the persons and activities in the communities that they are assigned to protect and by inclining citizens to trust and cooperate with police. This also achieves the primary goal of making citizens feel secure in their daily activities, thereby fostering a climate that encourages increased legitimate business activity, investment, and planning for the future.

Michael D. Wiatrowski and Jack A. Goldstone. The ballot and the badge: democratic policing. In: Journal

of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 2. Internet: <muse.jhu.edu>  (adapted).

    The role of the police in a healthy democracy is radically different from their role in authoritarian societies. In autocratic regimes, the police serve mainly to protect not the people, but the regime. The police are therefore typically politicized, with appointments being part of the patronage system that rewards regime loyalists. Police officers spend a great deal of time spying on the populace to unmask political opposition; crime against citizens is less of a concern. Abuse and corruption are usually rife, because police are not held accountable for their actions. Rather, political leaders tolerate abuses by the police in return for police loyalty to the regime.

    By contrast, in democratic societies the primary mission of the police is to protect citizens against crime and disorder, including illegal or corrupt behavior by officials. In democracies, police have carefully circumscribed roles that require close and positive relations with ordinary citizens. The use of arms and pursuit of criminals are rare and take up only a tiny fraction of police time. Instead, police officers spend the vast bulk of their time building relationships with the community through patrols, community-enhancing activities, and listening to citizens. The goal of democratic policing is to build a web of relationships between the community and the police that helps to control crime by making police aware of the persons and activities in the communities that they are assigned to protect and by inclining citizens to trust and cooperate with police. This also achieves the primary goal of making citizens feel secure in their daily activities, thereby fostering a climate that encourages increased legitimate business activity, investment, and planning for the future.

Michael D. Wiatrowski and Jack A. Goldstone. The ballot and the badge: democratic policing. In: Journal

of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 2. Internet: <muse.jhu.edu>  (adapted).